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Dr. Macagno’s paper begins as if it were going to be a case study on some verbal 
character attacks from the most recent Italian parliamentary election campaign. But 
after this entertaining introductory part it very soon gets down to a fundamental 
discussion of the argumentative structure and persuasive power of what he calls 
“emotive words.” There are actually two distinct questions he discusses, which are 
related to one another, but still of very different kind: The first concerns the 
structure of the chain of reasoning that leads from the predication of such emotive 
words to a decision to act; the second, and more difficult one, deals with the issue of 
what actually makes a word emotive. 
 
2. ETHICAL – MORAL – EMOTIVE? 
 
A first question in that respect concerns terminology. As a synonym for “emotive 
words,” Macagno adopts (from Stevenson, 1937) the appellation “ethical terms.” Yet 
what does “ethical” mean in that context? From a rhetorical point of view, there 
would be a big difference between terms “ethical” and “emotive.” The first might 
evoke the concept of rhetorical ethos or character, whereas the second would point 
to the domain of pathos or emotion. To be sure, an association of “ethical terms” 
with ethos would not be out of the way, since employments of such words could 
easily be interpreted as instances of ad hominem, or “ethotic” arguments, as Walton 
called them (1998, pp. 38-42; 1999), more precisely of their abusive type, which is 
commonly regarded as fallacious. They aim at destroying an opponent’s character 
and standing by application of denigrating epithets. Yet since the argument moves 
on from “ethical terms” (p. 1) to “ethical judgments” (p. 7) to “moral judgment” (p. 
9), it seems evident that ‘ethical’ here means ‘moral’ in the sense of moral values. 
Some more clear-cut definition of these central terms might have been helpful. 
 
3. CHAINS OF REASONING 
 
Macagno’s account (in Section 3) of the chain of reasoning that leads from the 
predication of an ‘emotive word’ to a particular action is based on earlier work he 
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has conducted with Douglas Walton and Chris Reed and which has resulted in a 
major book on Argumentation Schemes (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008). The idea 
that emotive words actually function as implicit or condensed arguments related to 
value judgments, has been investigated in earlier papers (with similar titles), which, 
however, rather focused on the relationship of emotive words to persuasive 
definitions (Macagno & Walton, 2010a; 2010b). The notion of persuasive definitions 
has been left aside in the present paper, perhaps because emotive words seem to 
work best precisely by not giving a definition.  
Instead, a closed chain of argument schemes is constructed that leads from 
the evaluation of a state of affairs to its classification, from classification to a value 
judgment (on desirability or undesirability), and from there to a decision to act. The 
argument schemes involved are all taken from Walton, Reed, & Macagno (2008) and 
have separately been experimented with in earlier papers (argument from 
classification: Macagno & Walton, 2010a, p. 19; argument from values: Macagno & 
Walton, 2010b, p. 2008; argument from goal to means: Macagno & Walton, 2010a, p. 
21), but are here for the first time combined to form this unbroken chain of 
reasoning that very aptly links a particular impulse to action to a particular 
assessment of a state of affairs. It is the first step (the argument from classification), 
in which emotive words may be involved. 
It would have been nice to see that scheme applied to one of the Italian 
election campaign cases. Here is a tentative try: Step 1 (argument from 
classification): If individual Silvio B. can be classified as falling under verbal 
category ‘pied piper’ (see p. 4), then he has the property ‘deceiver;’ Silvio B. can be 
so classified; hence he is a deceiver. Step 2 (argument from values): A deceiver is a 
threat as judged by the Italian electorate; Silvio B. is a deceiver; hence he is a threat. 
Step 3 (practical reasoning from goal to means): The electorate has the goal to see a 
good government elected; not voting for a person that is a threat is a means to 
realize that goal; therefore Silvio B. should not be voted for. It would be interesting 
to peruse the critical questions relevant to each step to determine the point when 
and where exactly such reasoning becomes fallacious. 
 
4. EMOTIONS, JUDGMENTS, AND ACTIONS 
 
While this chain of reasoning will work smoothly once a certain state of affairs is 
evaluated in a particular way, it is much harder to tell how the use of emotive 
language relates to such initial evaluations. To bridge the gap between the 
descriptive and emotive functions of words, Macagno resorts to modern cognitivist 
approaches, according to which emotions are based on rational value judgments or 
actually are such judgments. According to those models, emotions have two 
components, one that consists in the evaluation of a state of affairs, and another that 
motivates actions. 
 It is interesting to note that these modern cognitive theories more or less 
accurately reproduce the ancient Stoic theory of emotions. According to the Stoics, 
an emotion is based on the perception or imagination of a specific state of affairs 
(phantasia); but the emotion itself consists in a false judgment of assent 
(sugkatathesis) by the commanding intellectual faculty of the soul; this judgment is a 
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judgement about the truth of the perception as much as a value-judgment about its 
desirability or non-desirability; qua value-judgment it is also regularly accompanied 
by an impulse to action (hormé) (Forschner, 1981, pp. 114-116). On pp. 11-12, 
Macagno actually quotes a passage from Quintilian, in which this theory is clearly 
alluded to. 
 In Macagno’s reconstruction of the influence of emotive words and emotions 
on the perception and interpretation of reality, this original system seems curiously 
reversed. Whereas according to Stoic (and modern cognitive) theory the process 
leads from a perception of reality via a value-judgment to emotion (and action), in 
Macagno it apparently goes the other way: Emotion (such as contained in emotive 
words) first provokes a value-judgment; as Walton and Macagno write in an earlier 
paper: “On our view, a term is considered emotive if it leads the interlocutor to draw 
a value judgment on the fragment of reality the term is used to refer to” (Macagno & 
Walton, 2010a, p. 1). This value-judgment in turn induces a perception of “apparent 
reality” that is taken for truth. If I understand correctly, it is this mistaken 
perception of “apparent reality” that triggers the whole chain of arguments 
described above that leads all the way down again to ultimate action. 
 
5. PERIPHERAL OR HEURISTIC ROUTES OF INFORMATION PROCESSING 
 
Although on the face of it these processes seem complicated and circuitous, in real 
life they happen almost effortlessly and in practically no time. To explain this 
swiftness and easiness, Macagno makes use of the concepts of peripheral (vs. 
central) or heuristic (vs. systematic) routes of information processing. Both 
concepts belong to dual process models of attitude change: to the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) as developed by R.E. Petty and J.T. Cacioppo (1984; 1986a; 
1986b; Petty & Wegener, 1999), and to the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) of 
Eagly and Chaiken (1993; Chen & Chaiken, 1999) respectively. It might have been 
mentioned, though, that both models are ultimately based on the so-called Cognitive 
Response Approach to persuasion (Greenwald, 1968; Cacioppo, Harkins, & Petty, 
1981), which interprets persuasion as primarily based on the recipient’s evaluation 
of his or her own cognitive responses to persuasive attempts. 
Both models distinguish between a ‘route’ associated with elaborate rational 
cognitive processing of information, with high motivation and cognitive ability, and 
another route associated with low motivation and low cognitive ability that rather 
relies on cues or feelings. This second route works much more swiftly than the other 
and focuses on non-rational elements such as the authority or attractiveness of the 
speaker (that is, on typical elements of ethos), but also on influences by emotion 
(pathos).  
It should be noted as a warning, however, that, according to both models, 
heuristic or peripheral processing, swift and easy as it may be, does not result in full 
internalization, and thus any attitude change resulting from this channel remains 
temporary and unstable. True attitude change only happens through the central or 
systematic routes. Consequently, persuasion through emotion alone will not result 
in sustainable attitude change. 
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Under which conditions, then, is this peripheral or heuristic route taken? It 
must necessarily be taken whenever there is lack of time, resources, information, or 
rational arguments. This would associate it with situations of what Herbert A. Simon 
(1957; 1991) has called ‘bounded rationality’ (see Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; 
Kahneman, 2003b; Macagno, p. 14, quotes Kahneman, 2003a, but not for this 
matter). And Macagno rightly warns that the use of emotive words can in cases be 





In sum, Macagno’s paper makes a significant step forward towards a more 
appropriate analysis of the argumentative effect of ‘emotive words’. It seems clear 
that they have both a logical function (as condensed arguments) and a rhetorical 
effect (by arousing emotions). Yet it is also obvious that what ultimately makes a 
word emotive is still far from being clear. What then do we hide in words? Sadly, 
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